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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN B. YEATES, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
ARCHIE L. BUDGE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
and 
ARCHIE L. BUDGE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
MRS. JOHN B. YEATES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeals No's. 
7851-7852 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
These appeals involve merely a factual question. 
We, therefore, deem it advisable to make our own State-
ment of Facts. 
The original typewritten transcript of the proceed-
ings prepared by the reporter is filed as a part of the 
record in Case No. 7 482 in the lower court. A typewritten 
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2 
copy of the reporter's transcript of the proceedings was 
filed in Case No. 7 4 75 in the lower court. Both trans-
cripts are a part of the record on appeal. The proceed-
ings are, of course, identical in each case because the two 
cases were consolidated for trial. H'Owever, the official 
paging appearing at the bottom of the transcript varies 
in the two transcripts because of difference in the number 
of pages in the pleadings in the two cases. The reporter's 
page numbering of both transcripts appears in the upper 
right hand corner of each transcript and this paging is 
identical in both cases. We will, therefore, foHow the 
practice of appellants' counsel and in all references to 
testimony in our brief the same is to the page numbering 
of the reporter appearing in the upper right hand corner 
of each transcript. 
The actions in connection with which these appeals 
have been taken arose out ·of an automobile accident that 
occurred on September 11, 1951, (R. 3), at approximately 
6:00 P.M., (R. 4), just south of the Logan City Limits. 
Counsel for the appellant throughout his brief refers to 
Utah Highway No.1 which runs from the Idaho line south 
through Logan and thence south to Wellsville through 
the State of Utah. This highway, except to counsel, is 
commonly known and also formally designated by ap-
propriate markers as U. S. Highway 91 and is the main 
highway proceeding north and south through the State 
of Utah, (R. 6, 94). According to Section 36-6-12 Utah 
C'Ode Annotated, Utah State Highway No. 101 runs from 
Logan southerly via Hyrum to Wellsville. U. S. Highway 
91 proceeds in a general northerly and southerly direc-
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tion through Logan, Utah, and just south of the City 
Limits of Logan said F. S. Highway 91 curves to the 
west. ~\t this point said F tah State Highway No. 101 
proceed:5 in a southeasterly direction fron1 said U. S. 
High\vay 91. The junction of said Utah State Highway 
with said r. S. Highway 91 forms an almost perfect 
''1''. X orth of the said junction said lJ. S. Highway 91 
is a ±lane paved road. As said l-:-. S. Highway 91 curves 
to the west south of said junction it narrows to a 2 lane 
paved road. Utah State Highway No. 101 is merely a 2 
lane paved road. There is a stop sign on the east side 
of said Utah State Highway 101 at its junction with said 
r. S. Highway 91 requiring traffic on said State High-
way K o. 101 to stop prior to entering said U. S. Highway 
91. The physical facts and the manner in which said high-
ways come together were all indicated on a blackboard 
drawing made by State Highway Patrolman Roland 
Reese which drawing has been copied by the reporter and 
reproduced at R. 117. While there is no designation on 
the map to indicate directions, the top of the map indi-
cates south and the bottom of the map indicates north, 
(R. 4). The speed limit along U. S. Highway 91 at the 
scene of the accident is 35 miles per hour and was so 
posted at the time of the accident, (R. 33). 
The accident occurred on a clear day, (R. 10), with 
no obstruction to vision, (R. 11). 
Mrs. John B. Yeates was driving a 1946 Ford vehicle 
which was owned by her husband, (R. 4, 19), and was 
proceeding south from Logan en route to Hyrum, Utah, 
(R. 8). Archie L. Budge was driving his 1948 Nash auto-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.4 
mobile, (R. 70), in a northerly direction along U. S. 
Highway 91, (R. 9, 63). The 2 cars were thus approach-
ing the "Y" from opposite directions. 
Mrs. Yeates testified that as she approached the 
"Y" she was traveling at a speed of approximately 25 
miles per hour, (R. 7, 8, 9), and that Budge was traveling 
at a medium rate of speed, neither fast nor slow, (R. 14). 
When she was up by the bridge some distance north of the 
"Y" she was traveling in the far west lane for southbound 
traffic on said U. S. Highway 91. At that time she signal-
ed with her hand to change lanes and proceeded into the 
inside lane for southbound traffic next to the center line 
so that she could make a left turn at the junction onto 
the Nibley-Hyrum road, (R. 16). She testified that when 
she first observed the Budge car it was coming north 
on its own side of the road, (R. 16), and was then about 
a length or a length and a half of the court room from 
her, (R. 9); that there were no obstructions to her vision, 
(R. 11). Point A was designated on the blackboard map, 
(R. 117), as the point where U. S. Highway 91 and Utah 
State Highway 101 come together. According to Mrs. 
Yeates when she was about 100 or more feet north of 
Point A, Budge was just about at Point A, (R. 57-58). 
Mrs. Yeates testified that she had driven over the 
road a number of times, (R. 15), and knew it was a dan-
gerous intersection, (R. 19); that she knew there was 
a stop sign requiring traffic as it came north along the 
Nibley road to stop, (R. 15). She testified that she knew 
that the Budge car was going to continue north into Lo-
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gan as there was no other way for it to go, (R. 21, 24, 
25). 
··Q. (By ilir. Strong) ~Irs. Yeates, when you 
first saw the Budge vehicle there was no 
doubt in your n1ind as to the course it was 
going to take and that it was coming straight 
into Logan, was there~ 
A. \Yell, I guess that's right. (R. 24) 
Q. You knew that was the only road it could 
take~ 
A. Surely. 
Q. And you knew what road it was going to take 
when you first saw it~ 
A. Yes. (R. 25)" 
When she was about the length of the court room 
away from the Budge vehicle she applied her brakes, (R. 
19), because she didn't know whether she could proceed 
safely in front of it. At this time she had not yet crossed 
over the center line of the highway, (R. 16, 20). 
"Q. So that when you were about the length of 
this room away you applied your brakes~ 
A. Yes, sir. (R. 20). 
* * * * 
Q. At that time you didn't know whether you 
could safely proceed across in front of this 
Budge car~ 
A. That's right. (R. 20). 
* * * * 
Q. But while they were applied (meaning the 
brakes) you turned across the double center 
line into the lane for northbound traffic~ 
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A. Yes. (R. 21). 
* * * * 
Q. Well, that's what you did though, isn't iU 
You did turn over the double center line into 
the lanes of northbound traffic with your 
brakes on~ 
A. But that put me in my own lane. 
Q. Put you over the double center line, didn't 
it~ 
A. Yes, and on my own road going to Nibley. 
(R. 22) ." 
She admitted that she had not signaled her intention 
of turning from Highway 91 onto the Nibley-Hyrum 
·road, (R. 16, 17, 95). 
She testified that the front end of her car practi-
cally back to the windshield was over the center line of 
the highway at the time of the impact, (R. 18, 19). She 
admitted that there was no other traffic in front of her 
on her side of the road in the immediate vicinity of the 
accident, (R. 21). 
She testified that the right front of her car and the 
left front of the Budge vehicle collided, (R. 23); that at 
the time of the impact she was practically stopped, al-
though her car could have been somewhat in motion, (R. 
23). 
Mrs. Yeates testified that she expected Budge· to pass 
to the rear or west of her car, (R. 27), notwithstanding 
the fact that the front end of her car at that tune was 
over the center line of the highway and the rear of her car 
was at least partially in the inside lane of south bound 
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traffic. on Highway ~) 1. ( R. :28). She further ad1ni tted that 
she turned the ~teering wheel of her car to the left before 
the impact, (R. 30-31). 
Archie L. Budge testified that when he passed the 
35 mile speed limit sign about a block southwest of the 
"1,'' he reduced his speed to 35 miles per hour and slowed 
down to about 30 miles per hour as he approached the 
"1," (R. 53); that he first observed the Yeates vehicle 
when it was about 500 feet away, (R. 75) ; that it was 
traveling in the lane next to the eenter line, (R. 46-47), 
with no other vehicles at that time on the road between 
the two ears; that he continued ahead beeause there was 
no indication that the Yeates car was going to cross into 
his lane of traffic., (R. 47); that when the two vehicles 
were about 25-30 feet apart Mrs. Yeates started to turn 
abruptly into his lane of traffic. and without signalling 
her intention so to do, (R. 48, 65); that he applied his 
brakes and turned to the right, (R. 65); that he didn't 
have time to turn to the left or rear of the Yeates car and 
that this in any event would have plaeed him on the wrong 
side of the road, (R. 48). According to Budge Mrs. 
Yeates was traveling about 25-30 miles per hour and he 
thought she picked up speed as she turned in front of 
him, (R. 66). Folowing the aeeident,'Mrs. Yeates said: 
"I just don't know what happened," (R. 67). 
There were four passengers in the Budge vehicle, 
all of whom testified at the trial. Ivan Peterson, one of 
the passengers, stated that Budge slowed down as heap-
proaehed the intersection and was not traveling over 
30 miles per hour at the "Y," (R. 82); that he observed 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
the Yeates car traveling down the highway on its own 
side of the road until it got within 25-30 feet of them 
when it made a quick left turn, (R. 83) ; that Budge turn-
ed to the right and applied his brakes, (R. 83) ; that Mrs. 
Yeates gave no signal, (R. 83); that there was no danger 
or warning until Mrs. Yeates made the abrupt left turn, 
(R. 84); that in his opinion Mrs. Yeates was traveling at 
a speed of about 30 miles per hour as she made the turn, 
(R. 84). 
\Villiam Royce King, another passenger in the Budge 
vehicle, testified that they were not going fast and were 
traveling under 30 miles per hour as they approached 
the "Y," (R. 88); that Mrs. Yeates was traveling in the 
lane immediately to the right of the center line but made 
an abrupt left turn just a split second in front of the 
Budge car, (R. 89), when the Budge vehicle was about 
30-40 feet away, (R. 92); that the accident occurred 
about 3 or 4 feet east of the center of the highway, (R. 
91); that until Mrs. Yeates made her abrupt left turn 
he thought she was going to continue on Highway 91, 
(R. 93). 
William B. Smith, another passenger in the Budge 
vehicle, stated that as the Budge car entered the inter-
section it was traveling at a speed of about 20-25 miles 
per hour, (R. 103); that when the Yeates car got within 
20-30 feet of them Mrs. Yeates without signaling (R. 106), 
whipped sharply in front of them like she was going to 
make a U turn and at a speed of 20-25 miles per hour, 
(R. 102). 
Leatham MacNiel, another passenger in the Budge 
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vehicle, testified that they were traveling at a moderate 
rate of speed, (R. 108); that when he first observed the 
Yeates car it was in the inside lane cOining straight down 
the road but that when it got within 25-30 feet of them it 
made a quick left turn in front of them, (R. 108) ; that 
:Jir. Budge then turned to the right, (R. 108). 
Paul \Y. Hurd was driving a northbound vehicle on 
Highway 91 and had been traveling ahead of the Budge 
vehicle. He observed the Yeates car coming south on 
Highway 91 at a speed of about 35 miles per hour. He 
looked back over his shoulder and observed the Yeates 
car about at the time of the impact with the car about one-
half a car length across the center ~f the highway, (R. 
96). He testified that he had been traveling at a speed 
of 27-28 miles per hour and that Budge had not been 
gaining on him, (R. 97). . 
Roland Reese, the State Highway Patrolman who 
investigated the accident, (R. 32), testified that when he 
arrived on the scene the Yeates car was headed almost 
due east, (R. 42), with its front wheels 21 feet west of 
the east edge of the paved road and its rear wheels 26 
feet east of the west edge of the paved road, (R. 37, Ex. 
1); that the oiled portion of U. S. Highway 91 at this 
point was 60 feet in width, (R. 38) ; that he observed 37 
feet of brake marks from the Yeates car, (R. 35) ; that 
these brake marks at their north end started about on the 
line separating the two lanes for southbound traffic, (R. 
38, 40, 41). Patrolman Reese also testified that the Budge 
vehicle laid down 41 feet of brake marks, (R. 34), and 
traveled 13 feet after the impact, (R. 34, 35). Patrolman 
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Reese testified that he drew a map showing the physical 
facts as he found them on the scene right after the acci-
dent and before either car had been moved, (R. 39). This 
map was received in evidence as defendant's Exhibit 
No. 1. He testified that the diagram, Exhibit 1, had been 
drawn by him to show the situation on the highway as he 
found it immediately following the accident and that the 
diagram clearly showed the cars and the marks as good 
as an amateur could make it, (R. 39). He testified that 
from his observation the front wheels of the Yeates car 
at the time of the accident were about 9 feet over the 
double center line, (R. 42). 
With reference to the skid marks testified to by the 
patrolman, Mr. Budge stated that his marks were not 
skid marks but merely tire marks, (R. 78). He also 
testified that the length of his car was 18-20 feet, (R. 97); 
that he was present when the officer measured the skid 
marks and that they included the total length without 
any allowance for the wheel base and that the length of 
his car would, therefore, have to be subtracted, (R. 98). 
Mr. MacNiel testified that the measurements of brake 
marks from both, cars were made from the point of 
impact on the front of each car and therefore the marks 
included the front wheels; that the length of car, there-
fore, would have to be subtracted to determine the actual 
braking distance ; and that by doing so these marks 
would indicate that the two vehicles were about 40 feet 
apart when the brakes on both were first applied, (R. 112, 
113). 
Archie L. Budge sued Mrs. John B. Yeates for per-
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sonal injuries and for damages to his vehicle, (Budge, 
R. 1), and :Jirs. Yeates counterclaimed in this action for 
alleged personal injuries (Budge, R. 2). John B. Yeates 
as owner of the vehicle operated by his wife filed a 
separate snit against Archie L. Budge to recover dam-
ages to his auton1obile (Yeates, R. 1). Both cases were 
consolidated for trial and tried before the Judge with-
out a jury, the Judge in both cases, therefore, acting 
as trier of the facts. 
The court found that ~Irs. Yeates was negligent in 
turning left across the center of the highway into the 
path of the Budge car when it was so close as to con-
stitute a hazard and without keeping a proper lookout, 
and that this negligence was the sole proximate cause of 
the accident, (R. 6-7 Yeates case) (R. 5 Budge case). 
_Mrs. Yeates counterclaim was dismissed, (R. 59) (Budge 
R. 7). A judgment of no cause of action was rendered 
in the Yeates case against Budge (Yeates R. 9), and a 
judgment in favor of Budge was entered in his case 
against Yeates, (Budge R. 7). The only question in-
volved in these appeals is whether there was sufficient 
evidence to sustain the court in its finding that Mrs. 
Yeates' negligence was the sole proximate cause of the 
accident. 
POINT 
THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASES SUPPORTS THE 
FINDINGS AND JUDGMENTS OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
ARGUMENT 
There is no dispute that this accident occurred at an 
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intersection. Counsel for the appellants, however, takes 
the position that Mrs. Yeates was not making a left turn 
at the intersection. He bases this on the claim that Mrs. 
Yeates was allegedly on Highway 101 as well as U. S. 
Highway 91 before reaching the junction after leaving 
Logan and that she continued on that highway and by 
reason of this she was not turning left but in fact con-
tinuing straight ahead. As a matter of fact, the Hyrum-
Nibley Road does not commence and is not even desig-
nated except at the point of its junction with U. S. High-
way 91 and south thereof. In any event, an examination 
of the reproduction of the patrolman's map (R. 117) 
shows that Mrs. Yeates would have to turn left to reach 
the Hyrum-Nibley Road. Mrs. Yeates herself testified 
that she did turn left and that the front end of her car 
back to the windshield was across the double center line 
of Highway 91 at the time of the accident. In response to 
a direct question asked her by the court she admitted 
that she actually turned the steering wheel of her car 
to the left. Under such circumstances it is difficult to 
understand how counsel could decide that Mrs. Yeates 
was not making a left turn. 
Section 57-7-78 (ii), Utah Code Annotated 1943, 
defines an intersection as follows: 
"Intersection." The area embraced within 
the prolongation or connection of the lateral curb 
lines, or, if none, then the lateral boundary lines 
of the roadways of two highways which join one 
another at, or approximately at, right angles, or 
the area within which vehicles traveling upon 
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13 
different highways joining at any other angle 
come in conflict.., 
Section 57-7-137, Utah Code Annotated 1943, con-
trols the rights of motorists turning at an intersection 
and provides as follows: 
"The driver of a vehicle within an intersec-
tion intending to turn to the left shall yield the 
right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the 
opposite direction which is within the intersection 
or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate 
hazard, but said driver, having so yielded and 
having given a signal when and as required by 
this act, may make such left turn and the drivers 
of all other vehicles approaching the intersection 
from said opposite direction shall yield the right-
of-way to the vehicle making the left turn." 
We believe that these sections of the Utah statute 
are controlling and decisive of the facts and issues in 
the case. Under them there can be no question that Mrs. 
Yeates was in fact making a left turn. 
In these cases the court was sitting as trier of the 
facts. It weighed all of the evidence before it and con-
cluded that the negligence of Mrs. Yeates in making a 
left turn in front of the Budge vehicle when it was so 
close as to constitute a hazard was the sole proximate 
cause of the accident. The decision of the trial court 
must be upheld if there is any evidence to support it. 
We believe that the evidence in this case not only sup-
ports the court's decision, but under the testimony no 
other reasonable decision was possible. 
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There was evidence from which the court could have 
found that :Mrs. Yeates while traveling at a speed of 
20-30 miles an hour south along U.S. Highway 91 made 
an abrupt left turn without signal or warning across 
the double center line at a time when the Budge vehicle 
was within 25 or 30 feet of her; that at the time of the 
impact the front end of the Yeates car back to the wind-
shield was over the double center line; that the right 
front of the Yeates vehicle and the left front of the Budge 
vehicle collided. 
The undisputed evidence in the case was that the 
speed limit on U. S. Highway 91 at the scene of the 
accident was 35 miles per hour. No one testified that 
Budge was traveling in excess of that speed. Even Mrs. 
Yeates described his speed as moderate. Under such 
circumstances it is difficult to support the court's finding 
that Budge was traveling at an excessive rate of speed, 
but nonetheless, under the facts above mentioned, Budge's 
speed could not be a proximate contributing cause to the 
accident. Mrs. Yeates admittedly gave no warning signal 
of any type for her left turn and until her vehicle crossed 
over the double center line there was nothing to indicate 
to the defendant that she was going to turn left onto the 
Hyrum-Nibley Road. Since she was then within 25-30 
feet of the Budge vehicle and since the court could have 
found that both vehicles at that time were traveling at 
a speed of 20-30 miles per hour, an accident was inevi-
table regardless of the speed at which Budge was travel-
ing. In fact, Mrs. Yeates felt at the time she turned left 
there was going to be an accident (R. 34), and she was 
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still on her side of the road, but notwithstanding her 
feeling, continued across the double center line into the 
path of the oncon1ing Budge car. 
Whether Budge's speed was excessive under the cir-
cumstances, and if so, whether it was a proximate cause 
of the accident was a question of fact to be decided by 
the court sitting as trier of the facts. See 5 Am. Jur. 
P. 882, Sec. 689, where it is said: 
"* * * It is generally for the jury to decide 
·whether the speed of the vehicle proximately con-
tributed to the accident, and whether such speed 
was excessive, considering in connection there-
with the hazards of the surrounding circum-
stances." 
See also to the same effect 10 Blashfield Cyclopedia 
of Automobile Law and Practice, Part 1, P. 662 Sec. 
6607, where it is said: 
"Speed in excess of that permitted by statute, 
ordinance, or other traffic regulation may con-
stitute negligence per se; nevertheless there is 
still a jury question as to whether or not such 
violation was the proximate cause of the injury 
or damage complained of." 
See also 4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile 
Law and Practice, Part 2, P. 111, Sec. 2611, which reads 
as follows: 
"It is usually a question for the jury whether 
an excessive rate of speed is a contributing cause 
of an accident, so it has been held a question for 
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the jury whether the violation of an ordinance 
limiting the speed of vehicles in crossing a main 
thoroughfare was the proximate cause of a col-
lision of plaintiff's automobile with a telephone 
pole." 
See Frakes vs. Travelers Mutual Casualty Co. (Kan-
sas), 84 Pac. (2d) 871. In that case the defendant argued, 
as appellant's counsel does here, that since the jury found 
the plaintiff was guilty of traveling at a speed in excess 
of that provided by statute, that as a matter of law the 
plaintiff was not entitled to recover. The court held 
that this did not follow because it was still for the jury 
to determine whether the speed was a proximate con-
tributing cause of the accident. The jury did not so find 
and the appellate court upheld its decision. 
See also Bennis vs. Young (Calif.), 20 Pac. ( 2d) 
111, wherein there was evidence that both cars involved 
in the accident were exceeding the speed limit, but the 
jury found that the defendant's negligence was the prox-
imate cause of the accident, and the appellate court 
sustained the verdict. 
See also to the same effect Larsen vs. Webb (Miss.), 
58 S.W. (2d) 967, holding that negligence of a plaintiff 
in exceeding a statutory speed limit would not defeat 
his recovery unless such negligence was a proximate con-
tributing cause to the accident. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Martin vs. 
Stevens, decided May 1, 1952, and reported at 243 Pac. 
( 2d) 7 4 7, has held that even though there was evidence 
of negligence on the part of plaintiff, that it was none-
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theless for the jury under all of the evidence to deter-
mine whether that negilgence was a proximate cause 
of the accident or whether the defendant's negligence 
wa~ the proxi1nate cause of the accident. In the case at 
bar the court was 8itting as trier of the facts and found 
that the negligence of :Jirs. Yeates was the proximate 
cause of the accident. The court as trier of the facts 
was, therefore, doing what the Utah Supreme Court in 
the J!artin vs. Ste~·ens case held was its proper function 
under disputed issues of negligence and contributory 
negligence. 
Counsel for appellants in his brief argues that 
Budge should have passed to the rear or left of the 
Yeates vehicle and that he was negligent in not so doing. 
He relies on Section 57-7-130 (b), Utah Code Annotated 
1943, which, among other things provides : 
"Whenever pra.cticable a left turn shall be 
made in that portion of the intersection to the left 
of the center of intersection." 
We refer the court to the reporter's copy of the 
patrolman's diagram found at R. 142 for the purpose of 
determining whether counsel's contention in this regard 
is sound. Car No. 2 as indicated on the diagram shows 
the position of the Yeates vehicle across the double center 
lines. However, as testified to by Mrs. Yeate~, only the 
front portion of the car back to the windshield was over 
the double center lines. The diagram conclusively shows 
that it would not have been practicable or safe for Budge 
to have passed to the left or the rear of the Yeates 
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vehicle. This would have placed him entirely on the 
wrong side of the road and into the lanes for southbound 
traffic. He turned right when Mrs. Yeates made her 
abrupt left turn across the center line when he was only 
25-30 feet away and we submit that this was the only 
safe thing for him to do. In fact, according to Budge 
and all of the passengers in his vehicle there was no 
time to turn left in view of the suddeness with which 
Mrs. Yeates turned in front of them. 
Counsel for appellant in his brief refers to the 
brake marks from each of the vehicles as testified to by 
Patrolman Reese and argues that according to the brake 
marks the two vehicles were 78 feet apart since there 
were 37 feet of brake marks from the Yeates car before 
the impact and 41 feet of brake marks from the Budge 
car. However, it is undisputed by other testimony that 
the patrolman measured to the front wheels of each 
vehicle at the point of impact and that accordingly in 
order to determine the actual braking distance of each 
car the length of each vehicle would have to be sub-
tracted. Budge testified that his vehicle was about 18-20 
feet in length and the length of the Yeates car would, 
of course, be about the same. Subtracting the lengths of 
the two vehicles from their respective brake marks, this 
would indicate that the two vehicles were actually 38-42 
feet apart when the brakes on each were first applied. 
There was evidence that the two vehicles at that time 
were traveling at a speed of 20-30 miles per hour. The 
patrolman's drawing of Mrs. Yeates brake marks, (Ex-
hibit 1), indicates that the Yeates vehicle proceeded at 
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about a -15 degree angle from a point near the outside 
lane across the center line. It can thus readily be seen 
that ~Irs. Yeates did turn abruptly in front of the Budge 
car and when it was too close for Budge to avoid an 
accident. Her negligence under such circumstances was 
the proximate cause of the entire accident. 
~Irs. Yeates knew the course that the Budge vehicle 
was going to take because it was the only road which 
it could take. Notwithstanding this, she turned directly 
into the course that she knew the Budge vehicle would 
take. She created the hazard by turning into the path 
of the Budge vehicle and without giving any proper 
signal of her intention of so doing. She appreciated 
the danger while she was still on her own side of the 
road because when she first applied the brakes her vehicle 
was on its side of the road and near the line dividing the 
two lanes for southbound traffic. She felt then that an 
accident was going to occur and yet continued turning 
directly into the path of the oncoming car. She could 
have avoided the accident by continuing on her own side 
of the road to the left of the center line because, as she 
admitted, there were no other southbound vehicles in the 
immediate vicinity and nothing to have prevented her 
from so doing. The diagram prepared by Patrolman 
Reese at the time of the original investigation immediate-
ly following the accident indicates that the Yeates vehicle 
made a sharp turn and from the outside lane and at 
almost a 45 degree angle directly into the path of the 
Budge car, (Exhibit 1). 
We believe that the reasoning of this court in the 
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cases of Cederlof ·vs. Whited, 169 Pac. (2d) 777, French 
vs. Utah Oil Refining Co., 216 Pac. (2d) 1002, and Hard-
man vs. Thurman, 239 Pac. (2d) 215, is a complete answer 
to the position taken by the appellants in these cases. 
While the Cederlof case did not occur at an inter-
section, the question there was whether the defendant's 
negligence in making the left turn was the sole proximate 
cause of the accident or whether there was evidence from 
which the jury might find that the plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence in causing the accident. The 
court in that case points out that the jury could have 
found that the defendant made the turn very slowly in 
accordance with his testimony, or could have found 
that he did not slow down but turned suddenly into the 
plaintiff's lane of traffic. This is exactly the situation in 
our case. Mrs. Yeates testified that she made the turn 
very slowly, but in such event Budge would have been 
justified in assuming that since her brakes were applied 
she had seen his approach and was going to allow his 
car to pass before proceeding across his lane. If, on the 
other hand, the court believed the other testimony that 
Mrs. Yeates did not slow down, then, as indicated by this 
court in the Cederlof case, the result would still have 
been the same and the negligence of Mrs. Yeates would 
still be the sole proximate cause of the accident. In both 
the Cederlof case and the French case the court indicated 
that after all the one making the left turn has control 
of the situation. He knows when he is going to turn, but 
the opposing driver must discover it and even where the 
approaching driver is coming too rapidly, the left turn 
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drivers must take that into consideration. In the cases 
at bar :Jlr:::;. Yeates knew the course that the Budge 
vehicle wa:::; going to take, but Budge could not, of course, 
know \Vhich road she wa:::; going to take. She did not 
signal and gaYe him no warning of her turn until it was 
too late for him to avoid the accident. Furthermore, she 
knew the speed at which the Budge vehicle was being 
operated and had appreciated the danger by applying 
her brakes while still on her side of the road, but then 
she turned directly across the center line into the path 
of the Budge car when she could have avoided the acci-
dent in its entirety by remaining on her own side of the 
road. 
The Hardman vs. Thurman case merely held that the 
questions of negligence and contributory negligence in a 
left turn case were questions of fact for the jury. In 
the cases at bar the court was sitting as trier of the facts. 
The case is, therefore, stronger than either the Cederlof 
case or the French case and comes directly within the 
rule announced in the Hardman vs. Thurman case. The 
court sitting as trier of the facts resolved the issues in 
the favor of Budge and we submit under the evidence 
there was ample to support the court in so finding. 
CONCLUSION 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the judg-
ment of the lower court in both cases should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH & STRONG and 
DALE T. BROWNING, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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